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RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Stephen Dycust
1. Do Americans need to give up more privacy to be safer?
Frightened people may be willing to sacrifice some valued
rights, including privacy, if they think it will make them safer.
Today the willingness to sacrifice is the product of a balance
between a perceived risk of deadly terrorist attacks and the need to
assume some such risk in order to live in an open society. But in
our democracy the surrender of privacy rights must be knowing
and voluntary. That is, the American people must be aware of the
tradeoffs and must agree to the surrender, at least in a general way.
We have not always followed this practice since 9/11.
It is, of course, impossible to answer the question posed here
without more information about the threats we face and about the
sacrifices that Americans have already made unknowingly and thus
involuntarily in the name of security. More important, we cannot
determine the willingness of Americans to surrender privacy rights
without asking them. And ask them we must, if we are to be true to
our democratic ideals.
The USA PATRIOT Act (the Act), approved just weeks after
9/11, reflected a conscious decision to give the Government
greater latitude in conducting domestic surveillance for
counterterrorism.' Executive officials should perhaps not be
faulted for interpreting their delegated authority under the Act as
aggressively as possible-"right up to the line" was a term often
used. Still, few Americans and, apparently, few members of
Congress suspected that the Act might be viewed as permitting the
t Professor, Vermont Law School. Co-author (with Arthur L. Berney,
William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen) of NATIONAL SECURiTY LAw (4th ed.
2007), and co-author (with William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen) of
COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (2007).
1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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2collection of library patrons' borrowing records, or as dismantling
the long-standing "wall" between intelligence and law enforcement
officials.3  These losses of privacy, and perhaps others yet to be
revealed, can hardly be called knowing or voluntary.
Other legislation is so broadly drawn that neither Congress nor
the public could guess, except in the most general terms, what sort
of surveillance is actually authorized or what can be done with the
information collected. For example, the FISA Amendments Act of
20084 permits the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence to conduct warrantless intercepts of some electronic
communications, with only the vaguest standards and no
meaningful oversight or accountability.' While such a clumsy,
open-ended surrender is in some sense both voluntary and
knowing, it is based on an assumpion-a hope, really-that the
authority it confers will not be abused, that the only individuals
targeted will be those reasonably suspected of wrongdoing, and
that data collected inadvertently on innocent persons will not be
stored and later used against them. Congress, as representative of
the American people, has clearly failed in this instance to play a
meaningful role in husbanding its constituents' privacy rights.
Even more problematic are claims that legislation, which says
nothing about surveillance, nevertheless authorizes invasions of
personal privacy. The Bush administration insisted, for example,
that the National Security Agency's secret warrantless wiretaps,
dubbed the Terrorist Surveillance Program, were tacitly approved
6by Congress in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, as
an "incident of waging war."7 But news of the existence of the
2. See generally Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional
Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. &
POL'v 37 (2005); see also Press Release, Am. Library Ass'n, Library Connection is
'John Doe"-Board Speaks About NSL Order for Library Records (May 30, 2006),
http://www.ala.org/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Template=/Content
Management/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=1 28280.
3. See In reSealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
4. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
5. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 is described in Professor Banks'
responses. Seesupraat 5007-17.
6. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1541 (Supp. V 2005)).
7. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., to Pat
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program in December 2005, 8 as well as the claims of statutory
authority, caught almost everyone, including most members of
Congress, completely by surprise.
Some losses of privacy have occurred without legislation and
without any government effort at concealment. Examples include
enhanced airport security screening, RFID chips in passports, and
increased deployment of surveillance cameras in public places. 9
The failure to enact statutory prohibitions of these measures might
be thought to reflect a kind of acquiescence in them.
Yet the right to privacy plays such a critical role in the
functioning of our open, democratic society that it should not be
yielded so easily. Like other treasured constitutional protections,
its surrender ought to be deliberate and unmistakable, not the
product of inadvertence or inaction. In an analogous case, the
Supreme Court held in 2001 that habeas corpus petitioners cannot
be denied access to federal courts without a "clear statement of
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.... Congress
must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to
effect a repeal . . . . 0 The losses of personal privacy described here
do not meet this test.
Should the right of privacy be viewed more restrictively in the
light of the crisis currently facing the Nation? The expectation of
privacy that normally undergirds the Fourth Amendment might,
under the circumstances, simply be unreasonable. "[S] pecial
needs," the Government has maintained, justify abandonment of
the warrant requirement in the fight against terrorism." But in
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about
such an appeal based on exigency: "The laws and Constitution are
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.
Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are
reconciled within the framework of the law.'
12
8. The story broke in James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on
Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
9. Some of these measures have been challenged and upheld in litigation.
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1110 (2007) (requirement to show ID at airports); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260
(2d Cir. 2006) (random subway bag checks).
10. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-99
(2001).
11. See Letter from Moschella, supra note 7, at 4.
12. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). Here the Court echoed its earlier
pronouncement in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 76 (1866) ("No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
50332009]
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Privacy and security can be reconciled. I am not suggesting
here that Americans should know and approve every detail of each
measure taken to keep us safe from our enemies. The Framers
understood that some such details must be entrusted to our elected
representatives. At the same time, we are entitled to know about
such measures unless disclosure would unreasonably jeopardize
our security.
The Bush administration repeatedly refused to inform or seek
the approval of the American people or their representatives for
invasions of privacy, although in some instances disclosure of such
invasions clearly would not have threatened security. While I do
not seek to minimize the difficulty of determining what can safely
be revealed, the Bush administration's refusal appears to have been
based at least in part on a fear that approval of its actions would be
withheld. Such arrogance betrays the trust reposed in government
to act on our behalf in secret only when we have given our
reasonably informed consent. Until that trust is restored, no one
can answer the question posed at the beginning of this essay.
4. What is left for the Supreme Court to decide after the Boumediene
decision?
To the lasting gratitude of law teachers everywhere, the
Supreme Court provided many more questions than answers in its
June 12, 2008, decision in Boumediene v. Bush.'3 In the wake of the
2008 presidential election, however, we can now predict that the
answers it did provide will not be abandoned quickly.
The Boumediene majority ruled that the extraterritorial reach of
the constitutional writ of habeas corpus "turn[s] on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism."' 14 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its earlier decisions in the
Insular Cases,'5 Johnson v. Eisentrager,'6 and Reid v. Covert. 7  The
that any of [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government.") and the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649 (1952) ("The appeal...
that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an
emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although it is something
the forefathers omitted.").
13. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
14. Id. at 2258.
15. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1902); Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); DeLima v.
5034 [Vol. 35:5
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Court quoted with approval, for example, from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Reid, which argued that constitutional
protections should be extended abroad unless it would be
"impracticable and anomalous" to do so.18
The Boumediene Court indicated that the geographical reach of
constitutional habeas depends on several factors in indeterminate
degrees, including: (1) the citizenship of a detainee; (2) the
detainee's status, as well as the adequacy of the process used to
determine that status; (3) the nature of the places where the
detainee was apprehended and where he is currently held; and (4)
the "practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's
entitlement to the writ."' 9 In this instance, the petitioners were
aliens, but their status as "enemy combatants" was disputed, and
they had not yet been accorded sufficient process to give them a
fair opportunity to refute that status. They were not apprehended
on a battlefield, and they were being held at Guantanamo, where
the United States exercised "complete and total control."2 And
the Court found no prudential barriers to judicial intervention,
most importantly no undue burden on the military." The
Boumediene majority also seemed troubled by the risk of error in a
process that was "closed and accusatorial" and that might result in
confinement of the detainee for a generation or more. 2  Upon
these facts, the Court ruled that the constitutional writ was available
to the petitioners. But in future cases, without more refined
criteria, it may be very difficult to predict the outcome.
The Court went on to declare that if Congress seeks to suspend
the writ, as it did in section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of
2006,23 it must provide an "adequate substitute," to give a prisoner a
reasonable opportunity to show that he is wrongly held. According
to the Court, the procedures in the Detainee Treatment Act for
reviewing a prisoner's status are not such a substitute. But the
Bidwell 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
16. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
17. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
18. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255, 2262 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
19. Id. at 2259.
20. Id. at 2262.
21. Id. at 2274-76.
22. Id. at 2270.
23. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat.
2600, 2635 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e)).
2009] 5035
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Court was careful to avoid offering "a comprehensive summary of
the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus,"
24
leaving for the future a more precise articulation of those
requisites.
Reid and Eisentrager, which the Court analyzed in detail,
involved constitutional protections in addition to the writ, namely,
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We might therefore
guess that the Court is now prepared to extend the protections of
these and other provisions of the Bill of Rights to aliens abroad,
applying the same practical considerations. Indeed, the Boumediene
Court seemed to invite such an extension, declaring that "our
opinion does not address the content of the law that governs
petitioners' detention." 5
In 2005, U.S. District Court Judge Richard J. Leon ruled that
some of the Boumediene petitioners, as aliens held abroad, had no
rights to be vindicated in a habeas proceeding, and he accordingly
dismissed their application for a writ. 26 On remand, in November
2008, Judge Leon declared that detainees must be given a fair
opportunity to refute their characterization as enemy combatants.
27
According to Judge Leon, the Boumediene Court also left open the
definition of "enemy combatant" that would, if satisfied, justify the
holding of a prisoner.2s His determination of process due and his
application of the Defense Department's definition of "enemy
combatant" may be the subject of further interpretation by the
Supreme Court.
Other tantalizing questions are left hanging. For example,
Judge Leon noted that he had "no knowledge as to the
circumstances under which the source obtained the information as
to each petitioner's alleged knowledge and intentions,,
29
suggesting that he might have excluded evidence obtained by
abusive interrogations.
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
25. Id. at 2277. The Court seemed to signal its readiness to recognize such
rights earlier in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 n.15 (2004), where it remarked in
dictum that allegations of wrongful detention by aliens held at Guantanamo
"unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States."'
26. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
27. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 196.
5036 [Vol. 35:5
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Three things, at least, are clear in the Boumediene majority
opinion. The Court called the writ of habeas corpus "an
indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of
powers."30  It also declared that "[t]he laws and Constitution are
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.
Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are
reconciled within the framework of the law.,'3 Thus, the Court
confirmed that, even in the midst of a great crisis, we are a nation
of laws, that assertions of unilateral executive emergency power will
be reviewed carefully, and that courts will do the reviewing.
8. Is global warming a threat to American national security?
After eight years of denial and delay by the Bush
administration, the Nation's new leadership appears ready to
respond to the overwhelming scientific evidence that global
warming is changing the world in ways that will be dramatic, highly
unpredictable, and extremely dangerous.3 And not a moment too
soon. Even if most predictions are off by an order of magnitude,
the prospects for America's future are truly frightening.
The onset of climate change threatens the national security of
33the United States in a variety of ways. This new kind of
asymmetric threat must guide U.S. strategic planning for the
30. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
31. Id. at 2277.
32. The growing body of scientific evidence may be found in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT (Nov. 17, 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm,
and in the numerous sources cited therein.
33. Some of the ways are spelled out in JOSHUA W. BUSBY, CLIMATE CHANGE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (2007), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14862/climate_change-and-national-security.ht
ml; KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105-ageofconsequences.pdf; CNA
CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at
http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report; NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL
TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 53-57 (2008), available at
http://www.acus.org/files/publicationpdfs/3/Global-Trends-2025.pdf; Juirgen
Scheffran, Climate Change and Security, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May-June
2008, at 19; James Stuhltrager, Global Climate Change and National Security, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES & E NVT 36 (2008). A classified 2008 CIA study reportedly predicts that
climate change may "incubate terrorism" and provoke civil and international
conflicts. See Siobhan Gorman, Global Warming as Security Issue: Intelligence Report
Sees Threat, WALL ST.J.,June 26, 2008, at Al0.
2009] 5037
7
Dycus: Responses to Ten Questions
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
foreseeable future.34 Likewise, we must reexamine relevant laws
and policies concerning the use of force and preparations for war.
In the interest of national security, we must immediately make
every reasonable effort to curtail the carbon emissions responsible
for global warming. These efforts will require close collaboration
among friendly nations and potential foes alike, because climate
change does not respect political boundaries. Even heroic efforts
now, however, will not slow these changes appreciably for many
years.
The most destabilizing economic and political impacts of these
changes are likely to be felt outside the United States, although we
will not be spared the effects of extreme drought and regional
water shortages, which will affect agricultural production, or the
impacts of increased storm events and rising sea levels along our
coasts. Military forces at home may have to help in responding to
pandemic disease or future Hurricane Katrinas.
Such effects will be less easily accommodated in smaller,
poorer countries in the developing world. Shortages of food and
water, the spread of disease, and flooding of coastal lands will
provoke increased competition for resources and mass migrations
of people, creating serious threats to regional security. The poverty
that accompanies deteriorating economic conditions in some of
these countries will foster the growth of terrorism and extremism.
Some already fragile governments will become more unstable-or
simply fail. And some of these governments have or will soon
acquire nuclear weapons.
Faced with the prospect of unprecedented chaos and conflict,
the United States and its allies must work through the United
Nations and other international coalitions to help the most
vulnerable nations adapt to these changes, for example, by
furnishing substantial material and technical assistance. 35 If such
34. Section 951 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 951, 122 Stat. 3, 290 (2008), directs military planners
to "assess the risks of projected climate change to current and future missions of
the armed forces," and to "update defense plans based on these assessments,"
including the next quadrennial defense review, national security strategy, and
national defense strategy.
35. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4(4),
(8), opened for signature May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 851 (1992) (not yet ratified by the United States), commits party states to
assist developing nations with funding, insurance, and the transfer of technology
needed to adapt to the effects of climate change.
5038 [Vol. 35:5
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assistance fails, we may be asked to send military forces to support
humanitarian relief efforts. We must also be prepared to deploy
peacekeeping forces, with or without an invitation from such
nations, perhaps even unilaterally. And we must be ready to
respond militarily to other resulting international threats to peace.
Other sources of potential conflict are emerging. As the
global climate warms, new shipping routes have begun to open up
in the Arctic. Previously inaccessible resources there have become
the subject of international competition. Rising sea levels are,
through submersion and erosion, changing coastlines and may
affect the rights of coastal states over their maritime zones. Some
island states will simply disappear.
3 6
The future security of the United States depends on an
immediate, large-scale, concerted effort. Congress should create a
new agency, headed by a cabinet-level officer, with the task of
coordinating government and private responses to the challenge.
We need to reorient the funding, equipping, training, and
deployment of U.S. military and intelligence assets. A variety of
statutes and regulations must be reviewed carefully as we gird
ourselves for the coming crisis. For example, the War Powers
Resolution 7 might be amended to clarify the President's authority
to deploy U.S. armed forces in hostile conditions, for humanitarian
relief, or on peacekeeping missions. The Insurrection Act38 might
be amended yet again to make it clearer when troops could be
deployed domestically in an emergency.
The American people will be called on to make
unprecedented financial and lifestyle sacrifices. To gain their full
cooperation, they must be educated as quickly as possible about the
gravity of the threat, and they must be involved in planning the
U.S. response. Finally, if we are to survive as a nation with our core
principles intact, including our commitment to the rule of law, the
government actions outlined here must be marked by as much
36. The Law of the Sea Convention, United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1834 U.N.T.S. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), along with other
international and domestic norms, will play an important role in avoiding violent
responses to these developments. See generally Charles Di Leva & Sachiko Morita,
Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to Submerged
Boundaries? (World Bank Law & Development Working Paper Series No. 5) (n.d.),
and sources cited therein.
37. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
38. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2006).
2009] 5039
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